Polemarchus and the Friend-Enemy Distinction (1)
Polemarchus does indeed inherit his father’s position — at first. He recapitulates his father’s argument, which he sees as identical to something the renowned wise man Simonides said, “That it is just to give each what is owed,” (331e). Noticeably, this isn’t quite what Cephalus put forward. In fact, this is a much-reduced definition of justice. Cephalus maintained that justice was “speaking the truth and giving back what one takes,” (331d). Polemarchus’ (and Simonides’) definition of justice doesn’t hold onto the spoken truth. His position is yet more transactional than his father’s. And like his father’s definition, Polemarchus’ conception of justice buckles under scrutiny.
1. Interpretation, Techne, and Association
Socrates doesn’t understand. What could Simonides mean? His definition runs into the same problem Cephalus’ did: you wouldn’t return a weapon to a mentally unwell friend for fear of what he might do even if you technically owe it to him. Polemarchus agrees that returning the weapon would be unwise, but contends that Simonides' definition of justice shouldn’t be taken at face value. According to Polemarchus, “[Simonides] supposes that friends owe it to friends to do some good and nothing bad,” (332a). Understanding Simonides is a problem of interpretation at two levels: first, understanding what he meant, which requires situated his conception of justice within the realities of friendship; second, that once one has done this, one has to interpret the real-life circumstances at-hand to discern how Simonides’ dictates a course of action. This is a skill, to be sure. And the nature of the skill in operation behind Polemarchus’ argument is what Socrates has in mind to develop.
To develop this idea, he accepts Polemarchus’ new understanding of Simonides' definition: justice is paying what one owes insofar as you owe your enemies harm and your friends good. This is a traditional distinction, between friend and enemy, in ethics and politics. And it marks a development from Cephalus’ individualized merchant ethics — suddenly contested groups exist and one must negotiate how to behave towards each. And in Polemarchus’ case, it relies on a perhaps novel interpretation of the phrase “what is owed.”
In interrogating this interpretation Socrates wants for clarity. “[I]f someone were to ask him, ‘Simonides, the art called medicine gives what that is owed and fitting to which things,’ what do you suppose he would answer us?” (332d). Before we look at what a strange question this is, we should take some time to appreciate the arrival of the word “art” a translation of the Greek word, “techne,” which means “art, skill, or discipline.” We don’t have an exact correlate in English, but what Socrates smuggles in (and I would argue, what Plato means to forward) is a conception of justice as a kind of techne, like the practice of medicine, cooking, sailing, etc.
Polemarchus seems to accept that justice is an art like the others. In doing so, he’s gotten himself into trouble. Socrates asks, “And what about the just man, in what action and with respect to what work is he most able to help friends and harm enemies?”
“In my opinion,” Polemarchus responds, “it is in making war and being an ally in battle,” (332e).
But what about peacetime? Wouldn’t that make a just man useless? Polemarchus responds that justice is also useful in peacetime — for contracts, by which he means “partnerships.” As Allan Bloom points out in his footnotes, Polemarchus allowing that contracts include the more general concept of partnership, which we would understand as something like association today, the dialogue moves closer to the political realm. Justice isn’t merchant ethics, and though it is something like the techne of war and diplomacy (waging war and making alliances), it’s a different techne in kind. So of what use is justice?
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